

INTERNET SECURITY

Security threats:

Leakage	}	Information Domain
Temporarily		
Resource stealing	}	Operation Domain
Vandalism		

Attacking methods:

Eavesdropping	}	Social Engineering
Message tampering		
Message temporary		
Replay		
Exploiting		
+ Combinations		

Passwords: long, mixed chars,
no security questions
password policy traps

OSI layers:

	Physical	Data Link	Network	Transport
↳ Fragmentation			IP, ARP (→ Ping)	TCP, UDP, ICMP

Layer 2/3 Attacks:

- Ping of Death: initiate max IP datagram size
↳ with fragmentation
- IP fragment overwrite: overwrite Layer 4 properties
(+ tiny fragment) ↳ Port (firewall)
- Network sniffing: MAC flooding, MAC duplicating
↳ countermeasures
- ARP poisoning: MITM, DoS, gateway, single host
- ICMP echo attack: packet amplification (SMURF)
↳ amplification attacks
- IP spoofing

Layer 4:

<ul style="list-style-type: none">• UDP Spoofing / Hijacking• UDP Storm• UDP Portscan: zero length packet	<ul style="list-style-type: none">• TCP Scanning: open connection ↳ SYN Scan: not logged ↳ FIN Scan: ignored if open port ↳ OS fingerprinting• TCP Spoofing / Hijacking: hard• TCP DoS ↳ SYN Flooding ↳ Process Table Attack
---	--

UDP: connections unreliable
TCP: connection-oriented
three-way-handshake
↳ SYN, SYN+ACK, ACK

Race conditions: parallel execution of tasks, result of tasks depend on timing of events \rightarrow indeterministic behavior

\rightarrow Sequence of operations (A, B): not atomic, can be interrupted
 \hookrightarrow window of vulnerability: (t_a, t_b)

\rightarrow TOCTOU: time of check, time of use: assume something is still valid on time of use
 \rightarrow problem, if time of attack is between check and use
 \rightarrow check permission \leftrightarrow open file
 \hookrightarrow abstraction if using file-names: symbolic links

\hookrightarrow execve race, rm-r race, temporary files: guess name, link to other file

\rightarrow Beating the odds:

- attacker can try 1 million times
- attacker can slow down programs:
 - slow filename lookups: deeply nested directories
 \hookrightarrow chain of symbolic links (file system maze)
 - computational complexity attacks: worst case performance
 \hookrightarrow overflow bucket in hashtable (worst case)

\rightarrow Detection + Prevention:

- operate on file descriptors
- do not check access by yourself
- drop privileges
- locking (O_EXCL \rightarrow file open)
- static code analysis
- model checking

\rightarrow Examples:

- plase, execve
- Signals
- Race against the cage (Android)
- Web: Facebook, Starbucks

Web Application Security : mixture of different protocols, formats, languages
→ big technology stack + attack surface

HTTP: request / response line, header section, (entity body)

OWASP Vulnerabilities :

- Injection
- Cross Site Scripting
- Broken Auth. + Session Management
- Insecure Direct Object References
- Security Misconfiguration
- Sensitive Data Exposure
- Failure to restrict URL Access
- Missing Function Level Access Control
- Cross Site Request Forgery
- Insufficient Transport Layer Protection
- Using Components with known Vulnerabilities
- Unvalidated Redirects + Forwards
- Buffer Overflows
- Improper Error Handling
- Denial of Service
- Unvalidated Input

Unvalidated Input :

- many different ways of encoding information
- client side validation easily bypassed
- + taint analysis
- + whitespace validation
- + validation / sanitizing

SQL Injections :

- craft malicious query with input parameters
- gather information through errors
- Blind SQL Injection → odd knowledge
- Second Order SQL Injection → store malicious text / wait for another user what is maybe not validated
- + prepared statements, stored procedures

Parameter / Command Injection :

- input parameters for shell command
- + filter special-meaning chars

Session management : session data stored on server, associated with ID
↳ HTTP is stateless

Session ID Transmission : GET parameter, POST parameter, Cookies
↳ Cookies : non-persistent, secure, IP address included
encrypting cookie values → replaying

Session Attacks : Interception, Prediction, Brute Force, Fixation
+ SSL + random + hunting

- use existing solutions
- timeouts
- logout links no invalidate

Scripting: sand-boxed, same-origin-policy

Cross Site Scripting: make server render malicious script code
→ rewrite content, phishing, cookie stealing
→ stored vs. reflected

Techniques: change image source, to send information
beginners fill by unicode equivalents, line breaks
change form target to steal data

- + Content Security Policy
- + Static code analysis
- + Http Only cookies

Improper Error handling: fail-open security checks
display critical data in errors (database, stack)
+ error handling policy

Secure Configuration Management: improper file/directory permissions
default accounts / settings
unnecessary backups, sample scripts
misconfigured SSL

Secure Storage: failure to encrypt critical data
poor choice of algorithm
own algorithms
(passwords, credit cards, keys)

Denial of Service Attacks: consume resources at such a rate that
no other use can enjoy the service
→ Distributed variants possible DDoS

Flooding: exploited zombies controlled by masters
→ hide masters behind stepping stones

vulnerability attacks: vulnerability cause service to
crash or stuck in loop

→ hard to tell difference between
↳ anomaly detection, signature detection

Internet Applications

Remote Access: telnet, rlogin: insecure
ssh: replacement, since version 2 secure

DNS: map domain names to IP addresses

↳ distributed database

↳ name space hierarchically divided: each domain managed by a name server

↳ mostly UDP

→ 13 root name servers

→ server types: primary
secondary
caching-only
forwarding

→ if server cannot answer request, forward up in hierarchy

→ reverse lookup: ip-addresses in-addresses

→ queries can be recursive, iterative

Simple DNS Spoofing: authentication based on DNS names with reverse lookup
DNS server which is responsible for own IP responds
fake trusted name

→ countermeasure: normal lookup for returned name

DNS cache poisoning: DNS replies sent by UDP
→ spoof UDP reply

Spoofed DNS reply: match query, UDP port, DNS nonce field
→ attack caching server only

→ Denial of Service, MITM, redirect traffic

→ also used by providers

FTP: control and data streams, active and passive mode

active: client tells server to connect to local port

passive: server opens port and send it to client

→ configuration: anonymous write to home dir

→ passive connection theft

→ FTP bounce: port scan, run behind firewall, send data to arbitrary port

SMTP: no authentication → open distributed system

Open Mail Relay: does not verify message sender

authentication: IP address, SMTP AUTH, POP before SMTP

encryption: SMTPS, like HTTPS, STARTTLS

Address Spoofing: spoof IP address, forge source address

→ countermeasures: SPF (uses TXT records of DNS)

Spam: Gathering Email addresses: brute force
harvesting
malware

Delivering: open mail relays
web forms
zombie nets

Countermeasures: spam, filtering
blacklist
grey list

NTP: Time synchronisation protocol
→ all time based authentication
→ mischief: sends back 600 ntp clients
→ reflection attack, amplification attack

Testing :
validation : does design meet problem requirements,
verification : does implementation meet design requirements
→ classification : whitebox / blackbox
static : theoretically, no code is executed
dynamic : feed program with input, observe behaviour
→ automatic testing, regression testing, Software fault inspection
→ testing at all development phases

Requirements Analysis Phase:

explicitly state security requirements: how the system reacts to attack scenarios

Design Phase:

formal methods: mathematically describe and verify.
formalize state transitions and describe unsafe states
model checker ensures that no unsafe state is reached

attack graph: finite state model, security property,
set of attacks of state model that violate security property

Implementation Level

Static security testing: manual audits
syntax checker: basic check
notation based systems
model checking: model realized as state machine
certain states are insecure
analyse control and data flow
meta compilation: programmer adds compiler extensions
extensions check the code

Dynamic security testing: check system calls
check library function calls (eg. calloc)
Profiling: sequence of funct. calls, arguments
Fuzz testing

Fuzz testing: run code program with (semi-) random input
monitor for crashes, slowdowns, ...
→ protocol parsing
→ minimal protocol specification possible

Pre-Release: remove debug code, information, test accounts
reset security settings

Penetration testing: analysis for design weaknesses, vulnerabilities
results delivered in a report
- external penetration testing (from outside)
- internal security assessment (from inside)
- application security assessment

Limitations: time/slots, client defines scope, pay for report

Buffer Overflow : input instructions into memory
exploit program to change flow of execution

- modern languages provide automatic buffer size checks (memory management)
↳ C/C++ do not

- stack is composed of frames, upon function call: new frame pushed on stack
frame contains: local variables, previous frame address, return address, parameters

→ place shell code in unchecked buffer

→ overwrite return address to address of shell code

Shell Code: usually used to start shell with root rights

use system call to start shell

↳ passing arguments in registers and interrupts

↳ gather string addresses with jmp and call in shell code

Code Pointer: usually return address is used

overwrite with value which points to shell code

↳ NOP sled in shell code → value just needs to hit sled

Small Buffers: store shell code in environmental variables

Defenses: not executable stack, stronger version: write XOR escape (DEP)
address space randomization
stack canaries

Avoiding: use safe function equivalents, language extensions

- Non Executable Stack: code can be injected in heap
return-into-like possible

→ Return Oriented Programming: use existing code fragments
setup call stack to misuse these fragments

- Address Space Layout Randomization: avoid hitting shellcode by
randomize addresses
different layout on each execution
on 32 bit system: brute forcing

compile time def: high level language
safe coding techniques, safe libraries
canaries

run time def: data execution prevention
ASLR
guard pages

Cryptography

Shannon's law: Crypto is bypassed, not penetrated
→ Cryptography vs. Security Engineering

Cryptographic goals: confidentiality, integrity, authentication, non-repudiation

Kerckhoffs's principle: system should be secure, even if everything is public except key
Schneider's law: everyone can invent security systems that he can't think how to break

→ Unconditional Security (Perfect) : secure against any adversary
Computational Security (Conditional) : secure against computationally bounded advers.
Provably Security : proof that breaking is as hard as solving known problem

Cryptanalysis: frequency analysis
linear cryptanalysis : correlation between key and cipher
related-key cryptanalysis : correlation between key change on cipher
differential cryptanalysis : correlation between part of cipher input output

- models of attacks: cipher text only
known plaintext
chosen plaintext
chosen ciphertext

Symmetric key encryption: block ciphers, stream ciphers
↳ substitution + transposition (permutation): fixed network

Block cipher modes:

Electronic Code Block : split message into blocks, encrypt each block separately
→ does not hide data patterns, same key, message → same result
↳ block replay

Cipher block chaining : encryption depends on previous block, initialization vector
xor each plaintext with cipher of last block
→ CBC bit flipping attack : byte in next block altered
→ CBC padding oracle attack : return for padding in last block /
different error message for corrupt padding /
reconstruct intermediate value

↳ CBC MAC

Counter mode : generate encryption block with key, nonce, counter
xor encryption block with plaintext block

Asymmetric cryptography: Trapdoor one-way functions

Diffie Hellman key exchange: generate key without sending it over wire
based on discrete logarithms
→ MITM attack

Elliptic Curve Cryptography: discrete logarithms over algebraic structure
of elliptic curves over finite fields
→ shorter key for equivalent security
→ ECDH, ECDSA

RSA: based on integer factorization

Hash functions: maps message of arbitrary size to hash of fixed size (one-way)

cryptographic hash function:
easy to compute for every message,
hard to generate message that has specific hash
hard to change message without changing hash
hard to find messages with same hash

Language Security

Porter's law: Be conservative in what you send,
be liberal in what you accept

Input Path: Path of actions until input is displayed
↳ Synchronization, delayed Data, Compressed Data...

→ Polyglots, Error Correction, Packet in Packet.

Polyglot: Source / input that is valid in different protocols
→ binary polyglot: pdf, zip, jpeg

Protocols are languages: Input → Parse, Validate, Use
↳ more powerful than you think
↳ input recognition is undecidable if protocol too powerful
→ context sensitive languages are undecidable
→ Protocols are everywhere!

Porter's law brings massive security implications:
→ Ambiguity is insecurity

Transmission Security: Packet in Packet: interference at right place
Beacon in Packet: nearby client must not be connected

Compiler optimizations: functional equivalence := security equivalence
- dead storage elimination
- inline functions

Mobile Networks

Architekturen: 1G, 2G - GSM, 3G - UMTS, 4G - LTE

Identifikatoren: International Mobile Equipment Identifier: phone
International Mobile Subscriber Identifier: sim card
Temporary Mobile Subscriber Identifier: session

Attacks: TMSI de-anonymization
Internet interconnectivity
SIM cloning
Decryption: decode session key
IMSI catcher (Stingray)

IMSI catcher: harvesting users, eavesdropping calls/text/data,
interrupt user, attack phone

catcher acts like signal station to mobile phone
catcher acts like mobile phone to other signal station

catcher need changed location based identity
↳ mobile phone starts location update procedure
↳ catcher sends identity request (IMSI/TMSI + IMEI)

catcher downgrades connection security mode
↳ data is not encrypted anymore
↳ traffic MITM possible

→ possible because mobile network must not authenticate itself
↳ only mobile phone needs authentication

Catch on IMSI catcher:

Attributes: Frequency, Cell ID, Location Update / Register, UMTS handling (downgrade)

- Frequency: frequency plans
- Cell ID: cell database, correlation with GPS coordinates
↳ usually Cell IDs are stable
- UMTS handling: cell database: where is UMTS available?
- Traffic forwarding: Call Text

→ Mobile IMSI catcher catchers: Standard android API

→ Stationary IMSI catcher catchers: network of measuring stations

Embedded Security

Embedded Systems: not general purpose, but specialized applications
often no OS, or highly specialized OS
interface to communicate with outside
various architectures
often used for critical tasks: airplanes, payment systems

- in comparison to PCs relatively closed
- ↳ security by obscurity
 - Proprietary implementation
 - undocumented interfaces
 - undocumented protocols

High-Level Security Analysis: analyze communication protocol
replay attacks
fuzzing testing
→ does it crash?

Low-Level Security Analysis: analyze implementation
provides in-depth insights
time-consuming!

Goals: console access, restricted features, alternative firmwares
extract secrets

Techniques: Firmware Extraction: downloadable updates, logic sniffing
↳ Analysis: static, dynamic: emulation, real execution
↳ hard with black box devices

Debugging: debugging interfaces for testing, production
↳ JTAG Test Access Port, debug servers

Sniffing HW signals
Signal Injection

Countermeasures: remove debugging interfaces
SoC design,
tamper detection

Side Channel Attack: looks for relevant information on power usage, timing
→ timing, power usage, electromagnetic emanations, heat
↳ password check terminates on wrong char
→ timing

Fault Injection Attack: Clock Glitching
Voltage Glitching
→ alter device operation to skip password check

Microchip Reverse Engineering: optically read rom content
→ precursor for other attacks