TU Wien:Privacy-Enhancing Technologies VU (Weippl)/2023W TUWEL-Quizzes
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1. Introduction - OSINT[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
Which of the following statements about OSINT are correct?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- OSINT is used to de-anonymize individuals in criminal investigations.
- OSINT is the collection and analysis of data gathered from open sources.
- OSINT is an exclusive military strategy that relies on closed source data.
- OSINT relies primarily on data from "Freedom of Information" requests.
correct: 1,2
Public data from the Strava Fitness App enabled OSINT to ...[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Identify hidden military bases.
- Access heart rate information of well-known celebrities.
- Discover individuals with bad health habits.
- Map walking paths of guards protecting critical infrastructure.
correct: 1,4
What are "Google Dorks" and how are they used in OSINT?
- Google Dorks are employees of Google with special access to closed Google search data.
- Google Dorks rely on Google Search features to gather OSINT information.
- Google Dorks are a paid feature of Google Search.
- Google Dorks rely on public information of Google Search.
correct: 2,4
2. Anonymity - Nym[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
Which of the following technologies are building blocks of the Nym Privacy Infrastructure? [Welche der folgenden Technologien sind Bausteine der Nym Privacy Infrastructure?][Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Tor hidden services.
- Cryptocurrencies.
- Anonymous credentials.
- I2P services.
correct: 2, 3
The Nym Network ... [Das Nym-Netzwerk ...][Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- hinders timing analysis by employing cover traffic. [erschwert Zeitanalysen durch den Einsatz von Cover Traffic.]
- builds upon mix nodes exclusively operated by Nym Technologies S.A. [baut auf Mix-Knoten auf, die ausschließlich von Nym Technologies S.A. betrieben werden.]
- enables one-way communication without the possibility of replying to messages. [ermöglicht Einwegkommunikation ohne die Möglichkeit, auf Nachrichten zu antworten.]
- is a high-latency mix network for sending anonymous messages. [ist ein Mix Netzwerk mit hoher Latenz für den Versand anonymer Nachrichten. ]
correct: 1
3. Censorship[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
Which of the following statements about Domain Fronting are correct? [Welche folgenden Aussagen über Domain-Fronting sind korrekt?][Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Domain Fronting hides the censored endpoint in legitimate traffic. [Domain-Fronting versteckt den zensierten Endpunkt in legitimen Traffic]
- Domain Fronting does not work anymore because it is possible for censors to detect the hidden content. [Domain-Fronting funktioniert nicht mehr weil Zensoren den versteckten Inhalt entdecken können.]
- Domain Fronting works because it creates collateral damage if blocked. [Domain-Fronting funktioniert weil es Kollateralschaden verursacht wenn es blockiert wird.]
- Domain Fronting can be used in Tor. [Domain-Fronting kann in Tor verwendet werden.]
correct: 1, 3, 4
The Firewall of China works with the following methods ... [Die Firewall von China arbeitet mit den folgenden Methoden ...][Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Active probing to detect and block Tor bridges. [Aktives testen, detektieren und blockieren von Tor-Bridges.]
- DNS modification [DNS-Modifikationen]
- Manual verification using checklists. [Manueller Abgleich mit Checklisten]
- Breaking the symmetric AES encryption in TLS1.3. [Brechen von symmetrischer AES Verschlüsselung innerhalb von TLS1.3.]
correct: 1, 2
4. Secure Messaging[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
According to the talk: What are properties that many people think of when they argue for decentralized messaging systems? [Gemäß des Vortrags: Was sind Eigenschaften an die Personen denken, wenn sie für dezentralisierte Messaging Systeme argumentieren?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Less complex systems
- Censorship resistance
- Privacy
- Easy of use
correct: 2, 3
5. TLS[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
Which statements regarding DoH and DoT are true?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- DoH is a more complex protocol, so it is harder to implement.
- DoT can be easily blocked.
- DoH allows DNS resolution on application level
- DoH uses the TCP port 853.
correct: 2, 3
6. Tor[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
What is Arti?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- Arti is already available and used en-large.
- The name of the Tor implementation in C.
- The name of one the developers of Tor.
- A complete reimplementation of the Tor codebase in Rust.
correct: 4
Which statement about "Snowflakes" in the context of Tor is/are true?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- There are currently about 150.000 available.
- Snowflakes are browser extensions that are used to facilitate access to the Tor network in case of Internet censorship.
- Snowflakes are the exit relays of the Tor browser.
- There are currently about 15 million Snowflakes.
correct: 1, 2
7. Web Privacy - AdGraph[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
Which primary challenge does AdGraph research address?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- The lack of public ad- & tracker filter lists.
- The scalability of manually curated ad- & tracker filter lists.
- The accuracy of tailored online advertisement and user interests.
- The accuracy of crowdsourced ad- & tracker filter lists.
correct: 2, 4
The researcher's choice to benchmark AdGraph against Adblock Plus ...[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- is potentially skewed because Adblock Plus is not considered a state-of-the-art ad filtering browser extension.
- is representative because Adblock Plus is currently considered the most effective ad filtering browser extension.
- showed that AdGraph improved loading times as compared with Adblock Plus's default filter lists.
- showed that Adblock Plus outperformed filter lists generated by AdGraph.
correct: 1, 3
8. VPN[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
What is the gist of the “bypassing tunnels” paper which was published at USENIX Security 2023?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- An attacker can trick a client device into thinking the target server is on the same local network, thus bypassing the VPN connection to that server.
- Only macOS and iOS devices were found to be immune against the described attacks.
- They broke the used cryptography in VPN implementations.
- The described attack requires the attacker to have root permissions on the victim device to change the routing table.
correct: 1
What information is used in fingerprinting TLS connections using JA3?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- the browser user agent string.
- The ip address of the server.
- The offered elliptic curves & their points in the client handshake.
- The accepted CipherSuites from the client device.
correct: 3, 4
Which statement regarding the differences between JA3 and JA4 is/are true?[Bearbeiten | Quelltext bearbeiten]
- JA4 can work with QUIC and encrypted client handshakes (ECH).
- JA3 is MD5, JA4 is 3 part modular encoding.
- JA3 could already handle QUIC and encrypted client handshakes.
- JA3 is 3 part modular encoding, JA4 is MD5.
correct: 1, 2